

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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" As to a cordial union of interest between Holland and England, it is as unnatural to happen as between two individual rivals of the same trade: And if there is any step that England can take to put it at a still greater distance, it is the part she is now acting. She has increased the animosity of Holland on the speculative politics of interesting the Stadholder, *whose future repose depends upon uniting with the opposition in Holland*, as the present reign did with the Scotch. How foolish then has been the policy, how needless the expence, of endangering a war on account of the affairs of Holland."

—PAINE. *Prospects on the Rubicon*, 1787.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PORTUGAL. THE WAR.—It is truly surprizing to observe into what insignificance this subject has fallen with the public. A little while back nothing else was talked of; nothing else was heard of; it filled every mouth; and, amongst other reasons for imposing restrictions upon the Prince of Wales was this, that, if left uncontroled, he might totally change the system of warfare, and might *abandon Portugal to its fate*, at a time when every thing there promised *so happy a result*; that he might, in short, be advised "to undo all that Lord Talavera had done."

This is, to be sure, a fine specimen of the extent to which this nation can be deceived and cheated. Alas! the Prince of Wales can never *undo* what that famous oriental chief has done in Portugal. His Royal Highness, possess what powers and prerogatives he may, cannot put Massena where he was in July last; nor can he restore any thing that had been destroyed in Portugal, nor to us any portion of the many millions of pounds that have been expended in that war, and the raising of which in England must have so largely added to the distresses of the people and to the number of paupers. None of this can he do.—The readers of the Register were long ago prepared by me for the immense expences of keeping the army during the winter, and also no small part of the population of Lisbon. There cannot now be less than a hundred or a hundred and fifty thousand people to be fed from England and Ireland, besides, perhaps, thirty thousand horses and mules; while from France not an ounce of food is required, her general having taken care so to dispose his forces as to make Portugal find his army in all the necessaries of life, while, to our army, she affords not a mouthful!—Thus terminates the affair of the trap. This is the end of having

entrapped Massena; of having put him in a situation in which he was an object of ridicule and contempt; in which Lord Talavera *laughed* at him.—Oh, what a duped, what a gullied, what a cheated people this is! Where are now all the boastings of those swaggering blades, who, two months ago, in their numerous and endless letters from Lisbon and from the army, told us, that Massena was *starving*? Who told this "*thinking nation*" that the French General had, by the masterly operations of Lord Talavera, been drawn into a *snares*? Who told us, that they would give us a good account of him, and that we might *rely* upon it, that he never would be suffered to *escape*?—We have it under their own hands; nay, we have it in the official dispatches and proclamations, that some of the fairest parts of Portugal have been, by our army (for what purpose no matter) *laid waste*. Reader, pray *think* a little of that sort of thing, called laying a country waste. Think a little of the necessary consequences of burning, cutting up fields of green corn for horses and mules; of killing flocks and herds; of slaughtering the young in the mother's belly; of thus cutting off the means of restoration. Think a little of the effect of burning corn-fields, mills, homesteads, and manufactories. Think a little of the effect of first gutting and then burning work-shops and warehouses and cellars and dwellings. Think of the effects of these upon a people; if you do belong to "*the most thinking nation in the world*," pray think a little of these things; and, when you have so thought, tell me what we have done in Portugal to compensate the people for their sufferings. Tell me what the People of Portugal must think of Talavera's campaign.—The sufferings, which the enormous expences of this campaign have brought, and will bring, upon us must be very great; we must feel the effects of them

for years; they already press upon us in various ways; but, let us not forget the situation of the people of Portugal; let us not forget the situation of those whom to *deliver* was the professed object of Talavera's wars. —— When the Wellesleys were first sent to take the command, political as well as military, in the Peninsula, I said, that we now saw them *fairly pitted* against the Buonapartés, and I besought the reader to *mark the result*. “If,” said I, “these oriental heroes come off *victorious*; if they beat the Buonapartés; “if they drive them out of the peninsula, “I shall be ready to acknowledge, that “their fame has a solid foundation; and “that to gain victories in Hindostan is “the same thing as gaining victories in “Europe.” I still stick to my word; but, the criterion for my judgment must be *the result*. —— The same criterion must be our guide in judging of the wisdom of the ministers, who *planned* the war. —— The public will bear in mind, that I, amongst others, all along protested against a war for the *old governments* of Spain and Portugal. We said, that, in such a war, the people would have no interests sufficient to call forth the necessary energies. Mr. Canning and Alderman Birch said that such a war was the very thing for calling forth the energies of the people; that the *throne* and the *altar* (the *Roman Catholic altar*, mind) would call forth every hand in their defence; and the former gentleman, in an official dispatch, argued upon the existence of the hatred of the French in “the universal Spanish nation.” —— How has it turned out? “Aye,” say they, as Mr. Pitt used to say, “but “things have taken an *unexpected* turn; “who would have thought this, and who “would have thought that?” Why, as Mr. Fox used to tell “the great statesman now no more,” we should have thought it; we did think it; and we told you it would happen. You scorned our advice; you called us jacobins and levellers; and experience has now proved, that we were right and that you were wrong. —— Mr. Canning was the minister of foreign affairs when the plan of the peninsular war was laid; he was the prominent person in that measure; he, the eulogist of Mr. Pitt, and the steady pursuer of his system, was the leading author of that war, which will, before it be over, have done more for France than any other of the wars that we have waged against her. —— Will he pretend that the *principle* of the war was

good? The principle, we said, was bad; and, if it had been good, of what consequence is that, unless the *means* were at hand; and, if the *means* were at hand, where are we to look for a justification for the *want of success*? —— The *end* is not yet come, to be sure; but, who is there mad enough to expect, that we shall be able to put the French out of the Peninsula either by arms or by *negociation*? When is the man, in his senses, who believes, or will say that he believes, that we shall be able to accomplish this? Suppose *peace* were to become the subject of discussion. Does any one believe, that Napoleon would enter into *negociations* about Spain and Portugal? Does any one believe that we must not leave them to their fate? This is bringing the matter to the test. And, if the reader is persuaded, that we should not, in a *negociation* for peace, be able to stipulate for the independence of the Peninsula, the question is settled, and the result of the war is, in reality, ascertained. —— Let the reader, then, take a fair and full look at this war; at its origin, its principle, its plan, its execution, its *feats*, its *treaties* and its *medals*, and at its *costs*; let him then bear in mind who were its *authors* and *abettors*, who have been and yet are its agents; and, if he have a mind capable of profiting from experience, he will not fail to turn his observations to account.

FRENCH MARINE.—In a subsequent part of this Number will be found a report of the French minister of Marine upon the subject of a *conscription* for sailors, who are to be thus raised in the maritime Departments of France, which Departments are, on that account, to be exempted from the *military conscription*. —— This may serve as some answer to the question, so often put: “how is Buonaparté to get sailors?” Sailors are made of flesh and blood as bone and sinews as well as soldiers, and while these were in France or her dependencies, it was easy to conceive how he would get them, when the proper time came for their employment. —— The nature of the contest has, with him, now, a great measure, changed. Sir FRANCIS BURDETT said, in the House of Commons, about two years ago, that this would be the case; and that we should, even then, begin to prepare for it. Mr. CANNING laughed at him, just as Mr. Pitt used to laugh, or rather grin, at the predictions of Mr. Fox; but, now, as then, the thing

laughed. Napoleon, except S. require a. He has n. land. H. the North and fleet expect, a told by m. subjugation abundant fitting o. knows; t. intercept has already seen befitting numbers Hans Tow settled, p. system, f. for keepin this syst natural ef. to be with of invecti ing Post “ have al. “ plan for “ Forty th “ from th “ the disp “ rine; a “ hundred “ to be f. “ People “ ful priva “ to prom “ but to g. “ vidual, “ —— In “ thousand “ children “ 16, to “ manœuv “ of Franc “ tain train “ submitt “ to face t. No: I tru whether t backward enough of and mainta force, that able to se that only, so comple

laughed at is about to be verified.—Napoleon has subdued all the continent except Spain and Portugal, which do not require a fourth part of his military means. He has nothing to fear on the side of the land. He has got firm possession of all the North of Europe, its harbours, roads, and fleets; and he now, as was natural to expect, and as was anticipated and foretold by more than enough of us, he is making preparations for his last labour, *the subjugation of these islands*. That he has an abundance of the means of making and of fitting out ships of war all the world knows; that he has all these, subject to no interception or delay is notorious; that he has already made great progress in building a navy is not less notorious; we have seen before how he has collected great numbers of seamen in Holland and the Hans Towns, and now we see his regular, settled, permanent, efficient, and infallible system, for raising seamen in France and for keeping his navy replenished.—Of this system it behoves us to consider the natural effects, and not to suffer our minds to be withdrawn from it by empty effusions of invective like the following in the Morning Post of the 10th instant.—“We have already noticed Buonaparté’s new plan for the amelioration of his Marine. Forty thousand children are to be dragged from their parents, and to be placed at the disposal of the Minister of the Marine; and by a new Conscription, one hundred and twenty thousand men are to be forced into the army; and, the People of France submit to these dreadful privations, not to insure the safety or to promote the interests of their country, but to gratify the ambition of one individual, and that individual a foreigner! —In order to raise the above forty thousand a seizure is to take place of children between the ages of 13 and 16, to be trained to evolutions and manœuvres on flotillas in the roadsteads of France! Will the *hardy Sons of Britain* trained on the bosom of the element submitted to their rule, be ever backward to face the sailors of this new school?”—

No: I trust not. But, the question is not whether the hardy sons of Britain will be backward to face them; but, whether enough of these hardy sons can be found and maintained afloat to cope with all the force, that, in a short time, France will be able to send forth against them; and not that only, but whether they will be able to completely to cover the sea, at all sea-

sons, as to prevent a French force of great amount from reaching England, and especially Ireland. These are the true questions for us to discuss, and not the question of *personal bravery*, though one cannot refrain from observing, that, of the sailors of our fleet, a full fourth part are supposed not to be the “hardy sons of Britain,” but *foreigners*; and, that of the natives on board our ships of war, a full half were at first taken from the land without ever having been at sea.—The nation heard, one would think, enough of this *big, empty talk*, about the hardy sons of Britain from Mr. Pitt, to put them upon their guard against it. All the feeders upon the taxes talk in this strain. Their object is to keep the people hood-winked to the last moment. They are snug. They live upon the system. And, as long as they can persuade the people that there is no danger of the country being invaded and subdued, they suppose that they themselves are safe from the dangers of being called to account. If they were to acknowledge the danger from without, it is obvious, that they would be asked how this danger came; from what cause it arose; whose measures and what system have led to it? This would be extremely inconvenient for them. They see very clearly the tendency of such questions; and, therefore, they are always painting prospects in the most flowery dress. They affect to *laugh* at Buonaparté; but they never fail to utter *invectives* against, and, if they succeed in making the people join them in these, their work is, for the time, half done; for their hatred of *him* supplies the place of hatred of *them*. Just as if we can, with any show of reason blame Buonaparté for doing what he is able against us. We should have laughed at the whimpering of the French, if they had uttered *invectives* against us for taking *Valenciennes* or capturing their *Sugar Islands*. Lord Melville and his worthy associates told us, that this latter was a *true British object*. And, is it not childish in the extreme in us to utter invectives against Buonaparté, because he has laid a plan, and digested a system for the ruin of us? Just as if that were not a *true French object*?—The *commiscration* expressed by this venal writer for the French people; his affectionate regard for them; his tender concern for the *poor children*, who are to be torn from the *bosoms* of their weeping mothers to be sent on board of ship; all this is most despicably ridiculous; it is hypocrisy of the meanest, most contemptible

kind.—But, any thing; laughing or crying, canting or cursing, any thing in the world to draw the attention of the people from the dangers that menace them; because, as I said before, if they see those dangers, in their real character and magnitude, their minds must necessarily be turned towards inquiries into the cause; and the feeders upon the taxes well know to what those inquiries must lead. The trick, however, cannot long succeed. The danger must be seen first or last; and, the longer it is delayed, the more fatal will be the consequences.

HOLLAND, AND THE HANSE TOWNS.—In another part of this Number (if there be room, and, if not, in the next Number) will be found a report of a committee of the French Conservative Senate upon the subject of the annexation of Holland and the Hans Towns to France.—There is nothing new here in the plan or execution; but here are *the reasons* set forth; and, I would recommend this paper to the reader's particular attention. For, shift off the matter how we will, it must come home to us *at last*; we must look it in the face; and when that time comes, we shall be all aghast, unless we be duly prepared for it by previous reflection and discussion.—

Upon this subject, too, we resort to *invective*; a specimen of which I here give from the *Times* of the 11th instant.—“The public was before acquainted with “the organic Senatus-consultum, as it is “called, by which Holland is to be united “with France: we now publish what may “be esteemed Buonaparté's official de-“fence of that atrocious and cruel act, con-“tained in a Report or Address made by “the Chairman of the Committee on the “measure to the Senate. This is an in-“teresting, and, in part, an eloquent paper, “save that it wants the best principles of “eloquence; truth, and the defence of a “just cause. The annexation of Holland “is now most necessary, says the Orator, “because, from the first conquest of that “country by the Republican Armies, “there has not passed a single day, “when her union with the French em-“pire would not have been an invalu-“able benefit, since she would have been “spared a long series of privations, of “losses and misfortunes.” Can any “thing be so aggravating as this; to tell “a people that they have been so harrass-“ed, tortured, and oppressed by a *tyrant*, “that the greatest of all evils, as they ap-

“prehend, namely, the merging their “country in the dominions of *that tyrant*, “is perfect happiness when contrasted “with the misery which he has hitherto “inflicted on them?—“The public debt “not having received that immense in-“crease to which it has latterly arrived, “might have been saved from ship-“wreck: enormous charges would not “for fifteen years have weighed down “these countries.” And who has in-“creased the public debt of Holland to so “enormous an extent? Who has crushed “her by such excessive charges *but Bu-*“*naparte himself*, who now urges these her “sufferings as a justification of this *last of* “wrongs, the loss of her name and existence “as a nation.”—Now, of what avail are these invectives? And, indeed, how are they justified? Napoleon takes Holland and does what he pleases with it. I am sorry that he, or that any man, or *set of men* (for it is, in fact, the same thing), should have the power of doing what they please with any people; but, he holds Holland by the right of *conquest*, and it is quite wearisome and disgusting to hear invectives against him for appropriating Holland to his own purposes, while it is notorious that we have taken and appropriated to *our own purposes* so many Islands, and, in Asia, so many Kingdoms or Principalities. It is quite disgusting to hear this; and I am surprized when I meet with any thing of the sort in a print like the *Times*, the editor of which ought to know, that, at the very least, such invectives must tend to withdraw the minds of his readers from the proper view of the subject.—Besides there are circumstances in the case of Holland, which call for a train of observation of a very different sort.—We see the Holland, which was once able to cope with England upon the sea, now reduced to the state of a French Department. We see her garrisons filled with foreign troops; her offices occupied by foreigners; we see her, in a word, a conquered country.—Now, what is the kind of reflections that this fall of Holland is calculated to awake in the mind of a man whose observations are committed to print for the information or instruction of the public? No surely, the kind which this writer has indulged in; not reflections on the character of Napoleon's measures towards Holland, not unavailing lamentations over her fate, and quite as unavailing invectives against her conqueror. No: the reflections which naturally present themselves to a mind no

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hurried away by present objects, to a mind that does not skim upon the surface of things; the reflections, which in the contemplation of the state of Holland, present themselves to such a mind, turn upon the *cause*, or *causes*, of what it contemplates. To utter invectives against Napoleon, upon this score, has no more sense in it than there would be in uttering invectives against a wolf, which, in consequence of the fold having been left unprotected, should be found to have mangled the flock.

— Holland has been *conquered* by France. Napoleon found her conquered to his hands. He has, as was to be expected, treated her as a conquered nation. There is, therefore, no ground for *surprise* here. We do what we like with the countries that we conquer. We call the conquered dominions *ours*. Whether we treat the conquered people in India better than he does the Dutch is quite another question; but it is a question in which we have no interest at all. The question for our consideration, is, what was the *cause* of Holland being conquered by France, and that, too, in spite of the power of England? What enabled France to make this conquest? Holland and England were formerly able to dictate to France. What was it, then, that produced such a change as to enable France to make a complete and absolute conquest of Holland, and to do those things towards her, which are merely the natural consequences of that conquest? — Am I told, in the old Pitt strain, “that the volcano of the French revolution, bursting forth in every direction, spread its devouring lava over the States of Holland?” Is this old bombastical rant, this contemptible fustian to be an answer to my question? If it is, let me ask why our advice was not taken, and a little Spanish and Portuguese lava let loose against the French armies? If volcanic revolution be such famous means of *conquering foreign countries*, one would think that a little of it might be of use for *home defence*. — But, this was all nonsense, or, rather, deception. It was invective intended to divert the public mind from the real facts, and from sober reasoning upon those facts.

— It was not the volcano of the French revolution; it was not lava by which Holland was conquered; it was by men and muskets and bayonets and cannons and powder and ball. But, how did it come to pass, that the Dutch did not use these for the defence of their country? How came that to be? “Oh! why...hem...ha...hem.”

What? I ask you how that came to be? I ask you how it came to pass; that Holland, assisted by England, was unable to defend herself against men and muskets and cannons, having so many rivers and fortresses between her and the enemy. — “Oh! why...there were *traitors* in Holland...and...the *people were not true to themselves*.” — Very well! But, how came that to be? How came there to be traitors in Holland? And how came these traitors to be so *powerful* as to prevent the Dutch from fighting in defence of this country? If, indeed, the *people were not true to themselves*, that accounts for the conquest at once, without any reference to the powers of volcanos and lava. But, here again we must push on upwards to the *cause*. What made the *people not true to themselves*? Special brutes they must be, if they were *traitors to themselves*. Pity, indeed! Talk to me not of pity for wretches who were so false in their nature as to be *false to themselves*. — You mean to their government. In any other way your words have no meaning. They are nonsense. Well, then, what made the *people not true to their government*? What was the *cause* of this? There is no effect without an adequate cause. What made them so act, that the French found no difficulty in conquering their country? What made them stand cool spectators of the conquest? — This is what we should inquire into. This is what no one ever thinks of exposing to our view. Yet, this is the only point, in which we are at all interested. But, the truth is, that the answering of this question would not suit the views of those who are striving might and main to divert our minds from the real cause by invectives against the conqueror and by pitiful descriptions of the situation of the people.

— The real cause of the conquest of Holland by France, and, of course, of all the evils, to Holland and to England, which have followed that conquest, is to be found in the transactions of 1785, and the two or three subsequent years, when the people of Holland, after a long and obstinate struggle for their rights, or what they said were their rights, were reduced to submission by the introduction of a foreign army, and compelled, by military force, to yield to the will of the government. — This is the interesting point with the man who reflects. It is not the treatment, or the condition, of Holland now; but the cause which produced this state of things. — A minute history of

the transactions alluded to would occupy a volume of this size; but a statement quite sufficient for our present purpose will lie in a short compass.—At the close of the American war, in which the Dutch had suffered a great deal in their finances as well as in their colonial establishments and their maritime fame, the people, by their *Representatives in the States*, called for *inquiry, for punishment of delinquents, and for a reform of what they deemed abuses.* Their representative assemblies, generally speaking, was with them, and the Executive Government against them. Which side was right and which wrong we need not, at present, stop to inquire. Suffice it to say, that *the people* demanded what *the government* refused.—The dispute grew warm. Heats and animosities were engendered. At last, the Old King of Prussia, *Frederick the Great*, as he is called, who had *an army*, wrote a Letter to the *Representatives of the people of Holland*, in which he pretty broadly hinted to them that *that army* would be made use of, if they persevered.—They did persevere; and, at last (the Old King of Prussia being by this time dead) his successor sent a powerful army, such as it was impossible for the Dutch to resist; entered their territories; established camps; invested and took their fortresses; over spread the whole country; and filled with his hated Prussian Soldiers even the city of Amsterdam itself.—The commander in chief of this undertaking was the late Duke of Brunswick, who with the same army, and under the same sovereign, afterwards invaded France!—Submission followed. The people and their Representatives were compelled to yield to the force of a foreign army. The most humiliating conditions were imposed upon the assemblies. All those men who had been most active and had had most weight in opposing the government, were marked out for degradation in proportion to that weight and activity; and thus were the seeds of never dying hatred against that government sown in their bosoms.—France, who, as well as England and Prussia, had always endeavoured to preserve an interest in the councils of Holland, and who, perhaps, had, or thought she had, some reason to suspect the sincerity of the Dutch government, during the American war, favoured, as far as she was able, the popular side of the dispute; and England, on the other side, under the

councils of “*the great statesman now no more,*” made preparations for war against France, for the purpose of preventing her from holding Prussia in check; and thus England left the latter power at liberty to do that which she finally did in Holland; that is to say, compel the people, by military force, to submit to the will of the government.—PAINE, in his “*PROSPECTS ON THE RUBICON*,” a passage from which I have taken for my motto, and which he published at the time we are now speaking of, pointed out to Mr. Pitt the consequences of this measure. In that work he foretold what soon afterwards came to pass; and he most strenuously advised our “*great man*” not to pursue the same track.—One effect of the forced submission of the Dutch was, the emigration, in 1787, of many of the leading men amongst the patriots, to France, where a reluctance to reform was then brewing a revolution. Here the Dutch patriots found kindred spirits. It was combustible added to combustible; and, be it remarked in passing, the fate of the people of Holland, forced to degrading submission by *foreign troops*, served in no small degree, to put the French upon their guard, and to bring forth that body of national defenders, who have, at last, been moulded into the conquerors of Europe.—When the French revolutionary war began in 1793, it was quite natural that the *Dutch government* should be on the side of England and Prussia; and (whether right or wrong, for that is what we are not now discussing) it was not less natural, that the *Dutch people* should be on the side of those who were at war against England and Prussia, especially when the persons whose cause they espoused were also fighting against their own government, a sort of struggle in which the Dutch people had been so recently engaged.—Was it, therefore, at all surprising, that, when the Duke of Brunswick was driven out of France the people of Holland expressed their joy in every way that they dared? Was it at all surprising, that, when the French armies advanced, in a few months afterwards, to the invasion of Holland, they found fortresses fall at the first summons, which had formerly cost a regular siege of months? Was it surprising that the invaders had merely a march to perform, and were, in fact, received as deliverers instead of being opposed as enemies? But, besides these reasons for not defending their country against the French,

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the fact was, that the French army was accompanied by those very patriots, who, in consequence of the Prussian invasion and their subsequent degradation, had emigrated to France in 1787; who were so many conductors of the invaders; so many guides; some of whom had, indeed, considerable commands in the French army; and, if my memory does not deceive me, to the summons of one of these very men the first of the Dutch fortresses was surrendered. — What a change! What complete retaliation! What sweet, but, oh! what dreadful revenge! — The historian of the Prussian invasion, and of the consequent submission of the Dutch people, observes, that, when the fine regiments of Prussian soldiers, in all their gay attire, with their streaming banners, and marching to the sound of airs of victory, entered the City of Amsterdam, the people seemed to shun the sight; and that even the women and children, naturally so full of curiosity and so fond of such sights, shut up the windows, and sat brooding over their sorrow and their shame. — Reader, do you not feel for these people? Consult your own heart, and, if it be not fashioned to degrading submission; if there be in it one drop of blood that warms to the cause of freedom, it will tell you, that the Dutch people never could forgive; and that the children of those mothers, who, on that day, shut themselves up in darkness to avoid the hateful sight of their invaders, would, when they became men and women, have the desire of revenge firmly implanted in their bosoms against those invaders, their employers and their abettors of every name and in every degree. — Thus, then, we have before us here, the *real cause* of the conquest of Holland by France. It, perhaps, does not merit the name of conquest. The people, if they did not *invite, admitted and received* the French. They brought in the French against their government, as their government had brought in the Prussians against them. When the government reduced the people to submission, the people, as far as they were able, left the country and went to France; and when the people got the upper hand, the government went off to Prussia and to England. — It may be said, perhaps, that the Dutch people were *wrong* in the origin of the dispute, and that the government was *right* in refusing to grant their requests of inquiries and reforms. But, at any rate, it is beyond all doubt, that a vast

majority of the people called for such reforms, else why call in *foreign* troops? There is no getting over this. The Dutch government had a *native army*; and, if it was necessary to call in a *foreign* one, it is proof complete that the *nation* was nearly unanimous against the government. There may, indeed, be persons, ready to declare, that the *people* of any country have *no right*, upon any occasion, to have any thing to say in the measures of their government, supposing every man of them to be of the same mind, and suppose the acts of the government to be ever so tyrannical. To such persons I have nothing to say; but, I may beg them, for their own sakes, not to let us hear from them any charges against the tyranny of Buonaparté; for, if the people under his sway have *no right to complain of any thing*, who has a right to complain for them? — This question, however, as to who was *right* and who *wrong*, in the original dispute between the government and the people of Holland, is of no sort of consequence as to the point now before us. The *cause* of the conquest of Holland by France was the previous invasion of Holland by the Prussian army; and those, who now utter their invectives against Buonaparté because he holds Holland as a province of France, are in a sad dilemma; for, if they acknowledge, that the people of Holland were *right* in their struggle against their old government, then I ask them what Buonaparté has done, or what he possibly can do, more unjust or more cruel than what that old government was guilty of? And, if they, on the other hand, say, that the people were *wrong*; that it was for no good reason that they were hostile to their government, and that their receiving of the French with open arms arose from their own baseness, cowardice, disregard of country, and abominable and universal corruption, then I ask them, if it be possible to treat such a people too harshly, if it be possible to squeeze them or lash them too hard, and if all compassion for such a people be not, to say the best of it, a contemptible weakness. — Let them choose. — No, thank ye, they would rather not choose. They would, if it is the same to us, rather keep the dispute between the Dutch people and their government about *peculations* and *inquiries* and *reforms* quite out of sight and out of hearing. They would rather confine themselves to the *present* sufferings of Holland, as painted by themselves, and take it for

granted that the good old government had nothing at all to do in producing them ; and they would, besides, much rather that we should never turn our minds towards any “ *wild speculations* ” as to what the Dutch people might have possibly endured under a government protected by a Prussian army, and which our writers would, probably, not have considered as any military despotism at all.—No. It suits them best to amuse us ; to draw our minds away from all views of the real cause of the conquest of Holland and of the miseries they now paint to us as existing in that country ; to divert our attention from this by invectives against Buonaparte, intended also to furnish the grounds of an inference as to the consequences of his conquering us, and thus to scare us and terrify us into a resistance of his attempts against our country.—Shallow men ! How little must they have profited from the experience of nations ! How little must they know of human nature !—God forbid that we should stand in need of scaring and terrifying into efforts for the defence of our country ; for, if ever we do, the country will, assuredly, not be defended.—When men feel terror, the thing uppermost in their mind is, how they shall propitiate him who is the cause of that terror, and not how they shall, by open hostility, resist him.

—For the preservation of their rights, that they enjoy, any people will fight. But, the Dutch have shewn us, that when a people are deprived of what they deem to be their rights, they will not fight merely to avoid the chance of being still worse off, still more degraded and insulted ; and, notwithstanding all that we have heard about the present state of Holland ; notwithstanding all that we have heard of the misery of the people (and it is likely to be great enough) I must actually know the fact to believe, that those who shut up their windows to avoid the hateful sight of the Prussian soldiers, would, even now, if they had their free choice, change their new for their old government.—I heard a sentiment from General Craufurd, in one of his speeches in parliament, in 1803, purporting, that he would rather submit to the most fell tyranny that ever was conceived of native growth, than he would rather submit to an English Robespierre, than to the mildest sway in the world under a foreign conqueror.—The sentiment was, I dare say, sincere ; but, it was not the sentiment of human nature, as all experience proves, amongst individuals as

well as amongst nations. Brothers will not submit to brothers so readily as they will to other persons ; and who can want particular instances to convince him, that persons contending for an object of any sort till they become thoroughly embittered towards each other, prefer giving the whole to a third party, rather than forego the pleasure of obtaining vengeance upon their adversary in the contest.—It is precisely the same with nations, as the history of the conquests of France have clearly proved ; and, when we are drawing pictures of the miseries of the people whose countries have been conquered by France, we should not forget to place on the other side, the ample revenge which they have obtained upon their former rulers.—Now, though it may be too much, still I will hope, that these remarks and reflections, may go some little way towards inducing our writers, when they are upon the subject of French conquests, to indulge less in invective against Buonaparte, who is merely the agent, and dwell more upon the cause, or causes, of the events and consequences of which they are exhibiting pictures.

W^m. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate,
Friday, 11th Jan. 1811.*

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OFFICIAL PAPERS.

HOLLAND.—*Proceedings of the Dutch Ministry with the English Government, relative to the preserving of the independence of Holland by the means of a Peace with France.—1810.—From No. I. to No. IV.*

No. II.—*Instructions given by the Dutch Ministry to M. Labouchere, 1st Feb. 1810.*

(Concluded from p. 64.)

He will add, that, in case either a relaxation or a change of the above system shall be adopted, we may flatter ourselves, that besides the non-occupation of Holland, the war, as long as it may continue, will assume a new aspect, and much less disastrous than it has done for these three

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years; and that there will result a little more probability of an accommodation, inasmuch as then the Emperor of the French will have no motive to maintain the Decrees of Berlin and of Milan, which his Imperial Majesty has only adopted in consequence of the British Orders in Council of Nov. 1807.—If, however, the English Government, after having listened to these hints, raises difficulties about giving any definitive explanation, before being positively informed of the intentions of the French Government on the subject; it will be his duty to demand, that the English Government declare, whether it chooses to make its resolution to arrive at negotiations for peace, or at least to make a change in the said Orders in Council depend on the above hints, and in particular on the evacuation of Holland by the French troops, and the re-establishment of every thing on the same footing as before the last invasion of Zealand by the English, adding such other conditions as the said Government may think it its duty to insist upon before, according to the proposed measures, for the purpose of having sure *data* before making known to it the intentions of the French government.—Whatever may be the answer of the English Government to his representations, provided it do not exclude all hope of attaining the object proposed, and that circumstances permit him, he will provisionally prolong his stay in London; and in the mean time he will transmit to the undersigned, as speedily as possible, and by the safest channel, a detailed recital of all his proceedings, of the answers which are made to him, and of every thing that concerns his mission.—However, if, after having received an answer to the overtures made by him, he may find it necessary for the success of the cause, to convey it himself to the knowledge of his Majesty, he shall be at liberty to do so; but in that case, even though his Majesty may still be at Paris, he shall take his journey by way of Holland, and shall by no means repair to France directly from England.—In fine, the strictest secrecy is recommended to him in this whole affair, as well as the greatest prudence and discretion in the execution of the commission entrusted to him.

VANDER HEIM.—J. H. MOLLERUS.

No. III.—*Translation of a Note of a Verbal Communication from Marquis Wellesley to M. Labouchere, 12th February, 1810.*

The unfortunate situation of Holland has long excited sentiments of compassion in this country, which sentiments naturally increase with every aggravation of the misfortunes to which she is subject: but Holland has no right to expect that this country will sacrifice her interests and her honour.—The nature of the communication received from M. Labouchere will hardly admit of the slightest observation respecting a general peace. It even does not call upon England to repeat those sentiments which her Government has so often expressed on this subject. It may, however, be remarked, that the French Government has not expressed the slightest symptom of a disposition to make peace, or to abate in the smallest degree those pretensions which have hitherto rendered ineffectual the inclination of the English Government to put an end to the war.—The same observation is applicable to the war which the French Government carries on against trade, a war in which it has been the aggressor, and which it maintains with unceasing rancour. M. Labouchere is mistaken in the note delivered by him, when he asserts, that the English Orders in Council have given rise to the French Decrees against neutral navigation. The Orders in Council were not the motives, but the consequence of the French decrees. The French decrees are still in full force; there have been no measures taken for repealing them. It is not reasonable to expect, that we shall in the smallest degree relax the personal measures of protection which our safety requires, and which may defend us from the enemy's attacks, because he suffers in consequence of the measures he has adopted, and which he shews no inclination to depart from.

No. IV.—*Report of Proceedings by M. Labouchere,—London, 12th February, 1810.*

The undersigned having received from their Excellencies orders to proceed to England with written instructions, prescribing the means that he was to pursue to communicate to the English Government the situation of Holland, and to impart to it the means the most probable of averting the fate which menaced that country, proceeded to the Brill. He arrived there on the 2d of February, sailed from thence on the following day, and landed at Yarmouth on the 5th, in the evening, from whence he proceeded for London, where he arrived on the after-

noon of the 6th. On the morning of the 7th, he requested an audience of marquis Wellesley, Minister of the Foreign Department, which was given him at half-past five the same evening. After having communicated to his Excellency the substance of his instructions, and fully discussed the main point, he took his leave of this Minister, with an assurance on the part of the latter, that he would lay his communications before the council, and acquaint him with their determination.—Having received no message from his Excellency until the 11th, the Undersigned wrote a few lines to his Excellency, requesting him to give him some idea of the disposition of the English Government. He received in answer an invitation for nine the same evening, when he received the unsigned official communication, a Copy of which is annexed.—In this new conference a conversation took place respecting the probability, under any circumstances, that these overtures, whatever the decision of the English Government might be, would produce any sentiments of approximation on the part of France; and above all the inconsistency on the part of England, to admit the principle, that having once resolved on reprisals, as the Minister called them, the latter should of necessity cease with the causes that produced them.—It appears that the English Ministry attach very great weight and consequence to these same Orders in Council, which were the immediate object of the proceeding of the Government of Holland, and which, whether France agreed or not, the English Administration were persuaded afforded the most effectual means of enfeebling the resources of France. In fact these measures appeared to form the principal grounds of the system upon which the Government rested their principles and conduct, and it seemed that so long as the war lasted, it was only from a change of Ministers, that other measures and views might be expected.—The Minister also considered that, while, on one side, it was extremely uncertain whether any declaration or concession on his part would produce any alteration for the better, it would, on the other, be impossible to depend on their permanency; and that, in all cases, every proceeding which appeared incompatible with his honour and dignity, would on that very account be rejected, although it should appear to square with his interest.—The undersigned en-

deavoured to convince the Minister, that in this particular instance, the general interest, well understood, and the lasting prosperity of every commercial state, imperiously required, that the crisis in which Holland was, should not be looked at with indifference; on the contrary, that they should co-operate to divert the storm. He even confined himself only to the demand of a conditional declaration; but the result which he transmits is the only one he could obtain. His general observation, and the information he was able to obtain, lead to the following conclusions:—That the main question of peace or war engages little of the public attention; that they are reconciled by habit to the continuance of the war, and that its consequences, far from being felt at present, are rather favourable to private interest.—That the system of commercial restrictions its inherent in the present Ministry, and for the same reason is condemned by the Opposition; that it is therefore likely that for the present these restrictions will be enforced, in a greater or lesser degré, as well against America as other Powers.—That the English Ministry look upon a firm adherence to this system as the most effectual means of seriously affecting the resources of France, and of opposing her system of influence on the Continent; and that all attempts on the part of hostile nations to make them think otherwise, will only produce a contrary effect.—That it must not, however, be inferred, that a settled resolution has been taken to reject all proposals for peace; that probably they imagine it is the means of more speedily inducing France to seriously consider of some mode of approximation; that, probably, if the latter shewed any inclination of this kind, they would afford many facilities; but rather than this should rest upon a conviction, that at this instant the French Government had no serious thoughts of peace which could be accommodated to the principles avowed by the English Government, and that she is solely occupied in prosecuting her plans upon Spain and Portugal, which disposition would always be a serious obstacle to the success of any negotiations which might be commenced.—That under all the considerations of the time, those which relate to Holland, were only of a secondary and very remote interest, and that the conviction of the impossibility that any Convention respecting that country could ever, under the influence of France, offer any chance of security to England, unless it

was connected with a general arrangement, has blunted all that feeling which Holland would otherwise have inspired; so far, indeed, as not to draw any attention to the very important motives, which should induce them to consider this question separately and under an immediate point of view.—The undersigned, perceiving in this state of things no chance for success in any ulterior proceedings which the Dutch Government might be disposed to adopt, unless such proceedings were specially authorised by France, and that, therefore, with respect to that country, its fate entirely depends upon the question of general peace, he thinks that, conformably with his instructions, he ought no longer to uselessly prolong his residence in this country.—He, therefore, proposes to embark in a few days, and on his arrival he will have the honour to present himself to their Excellencies, the Ministers, and give them verbally a further and detailed account of every thing relating to the mission he was sent upon, and which he endeavoured to fulfil with all the zeal and anxiety with which the importance of the subject must necessarily have inspired him. He requests, in the mean time, that your Excellencies will receive the assurance of his respect.

LABOUCHERE.

FRANCE AND AMERICA.—*Letter from the Grand Judge to the Counsellor of State President of the Council of Prizes, relative to the revocation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, in reference to American commerce.*—Paris, 25th Dec. 1810.

Mr. President,—In conformity to the orders of his Majesty the Emperor and King, the Minister for foreign affairs, on the 5th of August, addressed a note to the Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, containing the following passage;—I am authorized to declare to you, Sir, that the decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that, from the 1st of November, they will cease to be in force; it being understood that in consequence of this declaration, the English shall revoke their orders in Council, and renounce the new principles of blockade which they have attempted to establish; or that the United States, conformably to the Act which you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the English.—In consequence of the communication of this note, the President of the United States, on the 2d of November,

published a proclamation, announcing the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees; and declared that, in consequence, all the restrictions imposed by the Act of May 1, should cease with respect to France and her dependencies: the department of the Treasury, on the same day, addressed a circular to the several Custom-house Agents in America, enjoining them to admit French armed vessels into the ports and waters of the United States; and directing them from the 2d of February next, to apply the law prohibiting every commercial relation to English ships of every kind, and merchandize proceeding from the soil, industry and commerce of England, if at the above date the revocation of the British orders in Council, and every Act militating against the neutrality of the United States, should not have been announced by the Treasury department.—In consequence of this engagement on the part of the Government of the United States, to cause its rights to be respected, his Majesty orders, that all causes pending in the Council of Prizes, on account of captures of American vessels, made from the date of November 1, and those which shall be thereafter made, shall not be judged according to the principles of the Berlin and Milan decrees; but that they shall remain in sequestration: the vessels taken or detained before being alone under sequestration, and the rights of their proprietors being reserved till the 2d of February next, the epoch when, the United States having reached the term of their engagement to cause their rights to be respected, the said prizes would be declared null by the Council, and the American vessels, along with their cargoes, restored to their proprietors.—

(Signed) The Duke of MASSA.

LONDON.—*Resolution of the Common Council, 8th Jan. 1811.*

SMITH, MAYOR.—*At a Common Council, holden in the Chamber of the Guildhall of the City of London, on Tuesday the 8th day of January, 1811.*

Resolved,—That while we view with the deepest sorrow the declared incapacity of his Majesty, to discharge the duties of the Regal Office, we cannot but regard with the liveliest fears and alarm the means that have been proposed to provide for the exercise of the functions of Royalty.—That we deem it an indispensable duty to our Sovereign and our Country, to declare in

this solemn manner our sentiments upon a matter so vitally affecting the stability and dignity of the Throne, and the rights and liberties of the people.—That the prerogatives of the Crown have been given in trust, and are in fact held for the benefit of the people.—That these prerogatives could not have been so given unless necessary for the administration of the Magistracy of Royalty.—That they must be no less necessary to a Regent, expressly appointed to exercise the functions of that Magistracy.—That the avowed design of vesting the Regency in his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, with restrictions and limitations, would, if carried into effect, necessarily destroy the equipoise which ought to exist between the three branches, and, by violating the integrity of the Constitution, essentially impair the interests and liberties of the people.—That holding as we do, “That it is an undoubted and fundamental principle of the Constitution that the powers and prerogatives of the Crown, are vested there as a trust for the benefit of the people, and that in that character only they are sacred;” holding most firmly this opinion, in the expression of which we repeat the ever-memorable and patriotic declaration of his Royal Highness himself, we cannot form to our minds any arguments for abridging those powers and prerogatives in the hands of his Royal Highness which would not justify and call for an entire and perpetual resumption on the part of the people.—That besides the constitutional objections just stated, the proposed abridgment appears to us as a similar proposition did to his Royal Highness on a former melancholy occasion, to contain “a project for dividing the Royal Family from each other; for separating the Crown from the State; for allotting to the Prince all the insidious duties of Government, without the means of softening them to the Public by any act of grace, favour, and benignity—a project for producing weakness, disorder, and insecurity, in every branch of the Administration of Affairs;” and, in short, for reducing his Royal Highness to the sad and disgraceful alternative of submitting to the dictates of men, whose implacable hostility to public opinion, exemplified in their open contempt of the right of petitioning, is not less notorious than their hostility to himself, or of resorting to the use of that baneful influence, the effects of which we feel in the enormous addition to our burthens; in the diminu-

tion of our liberties; in the impunity with which the people have been insulted; and which influence, while it is an object of just and deep abhorrence to us, cannot be otherwise to the noble and exalted mind of his Royal Highness.—That, anxious as we must at all times be for the full and efficient correction of abuses, and for a fair and practical Reform in the Representation of the People in Parliament, we deem ourselves equally bound to consider every attempt to impair and abridge the powers and prerogatives of the Crown, as a blow aimed at the very existence of the Constitution.—That Addresses and Petitions be thereupon presented to the House of Lords and to the House of Commons, humbly and earnestly entreating, that in such Bill or Bills as may be brought in for supplying the present melancholy incapacity of the Sovereign, his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales may be invested with all the Prerogatives of the Royal Office, whether they relate to the exercise of substantial power, or to the genuine lustre of the King of a free People.—That by a full and efficient provision for the incapacity of the King, which can alone restore the Sovereign to the Constitution, can that Constitution be reinstated, the suspension of which, at all times highly dangerous and alarming, is at this moment rendered infinitely more perilous by the flagrant arrogance, and notorious imbecility, of men, who have the presumption to call themselves the Ministers of the Crown—by the overwhelming weight of taxation—and by a war, the declared object of which, on the part of an inveterate enemy, is not alone the extinction of our commerce and best interests, but the total subversion of our rights, liberties, and independence, as a nation.—That the command over his Majesty’s Seals, assumed and exercised in the late instance, by ordering an issue of treasure from his Majesty’s Exchequer, exercised by the two Houses, appears to be subversive of the independence, and dangerous to the existence of the royal part of our Government; and that, to prevent the necessity of having again recourse to such perilous expedients, and thereby confirming and extending still further the alarming precedent, it is the opinion of this Court, that in the present suspension of the exercise of the Royal authority, the most constitutional course of proceeding would be, to imitate the glorious example of our ancestors, in the year 1688, by the two Houses of Lords

and Commons addressing his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to take upon himself the civil, military, and financial administration of the Government, until the proposed Regency Bill shall have acquired the form and authority of an Act of Parliament.

WOODMORPE.

LONDON.—*Resolutions of the Livery, 9th Jan. 1811.*

SMITH, MAYOR.—*In a Meeting or Assembly of the Mayor, Aldermen, and Liverymen of the several Companies of the City of London, in Common Hall assembled, at the Guildhall of the said City, on Wednesday, the 9th day of January, 1811.*

Resolved unanimously, That the end and design of all Government is, or ought to be, the good of the people—that the Prerogatives of the Crown are vested in the King, as a sacred trust for their benefit.—2. Resolved unanimously, That it is, therefore, equally their duty to guard, by every Constitutional means, against all encroachments and innovations upon the just and necessary Powers and Prerogatives of the Crown, as to oppose those encroachments and innovations which have so notoriously been made upon the Representative Branch of our Constitution.—3. Resolved unanimously, That, anxious as we are, to remove from the Government every species of unjust influence, equally injurious to King and People, and to promote a system of general reform, especially in that Branch of the Legislature, the corrupt state of which has been the great source of all our national calamities, the Commons House of Parliament; we, nevertheless, feel equally anxious to maintain the real splendour and dignity of the Crown, and all its just and necessary Powers and Prerogatives.—4. Resolved unanimously, That, deeply lamenting the afflicting incapacity of our most gracious Sovereign, by which the functions of the Executive Government have been suspended, we derive a cheering consolation in contemplating the many amiable qualities of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and the attachment he has invariably evinced for the Rights and Liberties of the People, affording the Nation the best grounds of confidence of seeing the Royal Functions wisely and ably exercised.—5. That, impressed with these considerations, we cannot but view all attempts to abridge the Royal Authority, and impose Restrictions upon the Regent, in the person of his Royal Highness, as

highly dangerous and unconstitutional, establishing a new Estate in the realm, to controul and counteract the Executive Government, and tending to render it feeble and inefficient, at a time when the state of the nation peculiarly requires its full energies.—6. Resolved, That we, therefore, view with concern and indignation the attempts which are made to degrade the Kingly Office, and to render it dependent upon those Ministers, who have so long abused the confidence of the Sovereign, who have uniformly shewn a marked contempt for public opinion, whose whole career has been a series of incapacity, misconduct, and violation of the Constitution: who have added to the catalogue of their crimes by usurping the Royal Authority, and who, not content with having engrossed patronage and emolument, and secured to themselves and adherents a profusion of pensions and sinecures, are now endeavouring to retain an unconstitutional power and influence, which would enable them to embarrass and impede the Executive Government in all its operations, and render it subject to their controul.—7. Resolved unanimously, That the command over his Majesty's Seals, assumed and exercised by the two Houses of Parliament in the late instance of ordering an issue of treasure from his Majesty's Exchequer, appears to us subversive of the independence, and dangerous to the existence of the regal part of our Government, and that to prevent the necessity of having again recourse to such perilous expedients, and of thereby confirming and extending still further this alarming precedent, it is the opinion of this Meeting that in the present suspension of the exercise of the Royal Authority, the most constitutional mode of proceeding would be to imitate the glorious example of our ancestors in 1688, by the two Houses of Parliament addressing his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to take upon himself the civil, military, and financial Administrations of the Government.—8. Resolved unanimously, That this Common Hall do petition the Right Honourable the House of Lords, and the Hon. the House of Commons, agreeably to the foregoing Resolutions.—[The Drafts of the Petitions being read, were unanimously agreed to.]—9. Resolved unanimously, That the said Petition be signed by the Lord Mayor, four Aldermen, and ten Liverymen.—10. Resolved unanimously, That the Sheriffs do wait upon, and request some Lord in Par-

liament to present the said Petition to the Right Hon. the House of Lords.—11. Resolved unanimously, That Mr. Alderman Combe, one of the Representatives of this City in Parliament, be requested to present the said Petition to the Hon. the House of Commons.—12. Resolved unanimously, That the Representatives of this City in Parliament, be instructed to support the said Petition in the House of Commons, and to oppose all attempts to abridge and fetter the Regent with restrictions.—13. Resolved unanimously, That the Thanks of this Common Hall be given to Thomas Smith, Esq. Alderman, our late worthy Chief Magistrate, for his very able, upright, and independent conduct, during the time the ardent and important duties of that Office were confided to him, wherein he evinced the most kind and friendly attention to his fellow-citizens, a dignified and unostentatious hospitality, a strict impartiality on all occasions, and a constant regard for the rights, liberties, and franchises of this City.—14. Resolved unanimously, That the Thanks of this Common Hall be given to Robert Waithman, Esq. who moved, and Samuel Favell, Esq. who seconded the several Resolutions which have been agreed to this day.—15. Resolved unanimously, That the Thanks of this Common Hall be given to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, for his readiness in calling this Meeting, and his impartial conduct in the Chair this day.

FRANCE.—*Report to the Senate by the Counsellor of State, Count Caffarelli, relative to a Marine Conscription, 15th December, 1810.*

SENATORS; We are commissioned by his Majesty to present to you the projet of a *Senatus Consultum*, in which you will take pleasure in remarking the character of public utility, of energy, and of foresight, which belongs to the vast conceptions of his Majesty.—The empire enjoys the most profound peace; the nations which surround it, deeply convinced that the surest pledge of their repose will constantly be found in their alliance with the French people, every day draw closer the ties which unite them to it, and appear to constitute only one and the same great family, by their sentiments towards the august chief of France.—And if the horrors of war still desolate the extremities of Europe, if the misled portion of a neighbouring nation, agitated by factions, still

mistake its true interests, you know, Gentlemen, that the cause must be sought for in the perfidious machinations of that Government, the enemy of Europe, which, repelled and menaced on all sides, has no longer any thing but a single corner, where it is still able to fan the flame of discord and of civil dissensions.—England blockades the ports of Europe; she parades upon the seas her ships, every where the objects of reprobation; she seeks openings for the produce of her manufactures, piled up in the warehouses of her dismayed inhabitants. Her criminal system is recognized; her snares have lost their effect; the nations at last know how to appreciate both her fatal alliance and her disastrous services.—Amidst the calm which his Majesty has re-established in the empire and in Europe, he is occupied with the amelioration of his marine; and his genius suggests to him efficacious means for opposing to his enemies upon the seas, numerous fleets, animated, like his veteran and formidable phalanxes, with a desire at last to conquer an universal peace. The will of his Majesty shall be always that of destiny; for power and genius never will in vain.—Already, Gentlemen, at the voice of his Majesty, maritime establishments are created; our coasts the extent of which is augmented, are every where defended by courage and fortified by art; the arsenals are provided with necessary materials! ships are rising in our ports, and our fleets will one day try their strength with those of the enemy, and reign upon the seas.—But to arm these vessels, to equip them, his Majesty has felt that he stood in need of seamen. Those who at present man his squadrons, would not be sufficient for the greatness of his plans; new means are necessary for new views.—Commerce and the fisheries, which were wont to furnish seamen for the State, are at present too inconsiderable, and a new system must be forthwith resorted to for supplying the wants of the country.—At the voice of his Majesty there issues from the maritime departments, a crowd of young men, who, being at once sailors and soldiers, will shew themselves worthy rivals of those who have raised so high the glory of the arms of the Empire.—We shall now unfold to you, Gentlemen, the basis of that Institution, from which his Majesty expects the most advantageous results.—The Emperor has perceived that the mode of conscription can alone procure for the marine those re-

sources in men which it requires; but he has felt that this mode could not be extended through the whole of our territory, for the inclinations of men are generally the fruit of their habits. Thus, the inhabitant of the towns of the interior never sees the sea or seamen; a stranger to that element, to that mode of life, he forms to himself only a monstrous idea of it: he prefers the land-service, for which the innumerable victories of our armies have already excited his early enthusiasm.—The inhabitant of the coast, on the contrary, from his earliest years is hearing the sea-service talked of; around him every thing presents the image of it; while yet a child he gambols in that element, upon which he will one day brave the storm and the battle. Born on coasts adjacent to those of the enemy, he feels the necessity of defending them, because he has to protect his family and his property. He is actuated more than any other with the feeling of resistance to aggression; he is at once a man and a citizen.—It is from the maritime departments, then, that the marine must be recruited; it is from the line of coasts that must be made the selection of men destined to serve on the sea.—But the profession of the seaman is liable to so many vicissitudes and dangers, that it is necessary to commence it from the most tender age, when the organs are docile, the body flexible, and habits are contracted without difficulty. It is necessary that the mariner should be early accustomed to peril, and learn to face it with a smile.—Young sailors shall therefore be selected at the age of from 13 to 16; if younger, the State would wait too long before it enjoyed their services; if older, the physical constitution of man could only be bent with difficulty to all the toils of seamanship.—Here it is our duty to communicate one of those fine thoughts of the Emperor—that of initiating from the present moment, these young conscripts, in the career which they are destined to run.—His Majesty has formed crews for ships, and crews for flotillas. The former, composed of experienced mariners, will man the ships; for the latter, his Majesty is fitting out in his ports small vessels, commanded by skilful officers; on board which will be exercised in manœuvres, in steering, in the use of arms, those young seamen, whom the *Senatus Consultum*, which we present, summons to the honour of serving their country.—Doubtless, Gentlemen,

the experience which they will acquire in the navigation of the coasts and in the roads, will not be so great as that communicated by distant expeditions; but they will thus be familiarised with their state, they will see and will vanquish its difficulties; they will acquire a taste for it, even in this way, that it will present to them obstacles which they will have to surmount; and in a few years they will be fit to serve in a more useful manner on board the ships of his Majesty.—At the same time that his Majesty projected means for training to himself seamen, he has ordered the necessary measures for forming the officers who are to command them. Every thing is connected in his conceptions; their whole always bears the impression of the genius who presides over the prosperity of the Empire.

Projet of the Senatus Consultum.

Art. I. The coast-districts of the thirty departments hereafter named shall cease to contribute to the conscription for the land-army, and shall be reserved for the conscription for the sea-service.

II. The following are the thirty departments in which the maritime districts shall be reserved:—Maritime Alps, Appenines, Aude, Mouths of the Rhone, Calvados, Lower Charente, Coasts of the North, Dyle, the Scheldt, Finisterre, Gard, Genoa, Gironde, Herault, Ile and Vilaine, Landes, Lower Loire, Lys, Manche, Montencale, Morbihan, Two Nethers, Nord, Par de Calais, Lower Pyrenees, Eastern Pyrenees, Lewer Seine, Somme, Var, Vendee.—III. Ten thousand conscripts of each of the classes of 1813, 1814, 1815, and 1816, shall be immediately placed at the disposal of the Minister of Marine. IV. The present *Senatus Consultum* shall be transmitted in a message to his Majesty the Emperor and King.

FRANCE.—*Address of the Conservative Senate to the Emperor, in answer to his Message, of the 10th of Dec. 1810, relative to the Marine and Military conscription.*

The Conservative Senate, assembled in the number of members prescribed by Article XC of the Act of the Constitution of 1799, having taken into its consideration the Message of his Majesty the Emperor and King of the 10th of December, and the Report of their Special Commission thereon, decrees that the following Address be presented to his Majesty by the

President and Secretaries;—Sire,—The depth and extent of your plans, the candour and generosity of your policy, and your constant anxiety for the prosperity of your subjects, have never been manifested more strongly than in your Imperial and Royal Majesty's message to the Senate.—The Orders of the British Council have not only rent in pieces the public law of Europe, but have also violated those natural laws, which are as old and as eternal as the globe. Nature herself has placed the seas beyond the dominion of man. He may pass over, but he cannot maintain possession of them; and to affect to rule an element which surrounds the habitable globe on every side, is nothing less than a daring attempt to hold the old and the new world in captivity, and to fix a disgraceful mark of slavery on all mankind.—Such is the sacrilegious attempt against which your Majesty unites all the efforts in your power. Justly indignant Europe applauds and seconds you.—Already does this restless and turbulent Government, which had excited five successive coalitions against France, destroyed in a moment by your victorious arms, see all the nations of the Continent leagued against her, and her vessels repelled from every port. It can no longer keep up its internal circulation but by a fictitious medium, or its foreign trade but by smuggling. The only allies which it has on earth are fanaticism and sedition.—Persevere, Sire, in this sacred war, undertaken for the honour of the French name and the independence of nations. The day on which this war ends will be the era of the peace of the world.—The measures proposed by your Majesty will accelerate that period; since your only enemies are to be found on the ocean, it is necessary for you to render yourself master of all the ports by which the ocean has communication with the interior provinces of your empire.—In the midst of these military and political operations, your benevolent solicitude has inspired you with the idea of reviving that northern trade, which has been for so long a time the fruitful source of encouragement and prosperity to French industry. The productions of the South of the Empire will be conveyed by safe and easy routes into the ports of the Baltic, and the knots of the treaty of Tilsit will be drawn closer by

this new tie of nations.—The conscripts of 1811, under the impulse of honour, of affection, and of gratitude, will, with a proud satisfaction, range themselves around your triumphant eagles, and esteem themselves honoured in paying the glorious tribute which every Frenchman owes to his Sovereign and his country.—It is evident that your Majesty's paternal heart feels regret in demanding this tribute, but you have wherewith to console yourself in the reflection that the prosperous situation of your finances will allow you not to require any sacrifices from your people.—The Senate, Sire, in offering you the homage of their devotedness, love and unshaken fidelity, only express to you sentiments which are felt by all your subjects.

FRANCE.—*Report of a Committee in the Conservative Senate upon the subject of the annexation of Holland and the Hans Towns to France.*—13th Dec. 1810.

Senators,—The Committee to whom you referred the projet of a *Senatus Consultum*, relative to the annexation of Holland and the Hans Towns to the French territory, have charged me to lay before you the motives which call for the adoption of measures of so great an interest.—During the course of the labours of the Committee, one leading idea principally impressed our minds: we have not ceased to feel astonished, that events commanded by so many different circumstances, had been so long deferred.—In reality, Senators, from the period when our victorious armies snatched Holland from the threefold oppression of the coalesced powers, she lost that existence which Frederick had designated with so much energy and truth; she ceased to be a bark, by turns in tow of the two great ships of war; France and England; her crew, to continue the comparison, were turned over to our ship; Brabant formed a part of our territory, and Holland was irrecoverably conquered. There has not passed, since, a single day when her union with the French empire would not have been a benefit; and we say it with confidence, an invaluable benefit, since she would have been spared a long series of privations, of losses, and of misfortunes.

(To be continued.)